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CASES NOTED
an appreciable number of qualified Negroes in the community." Since the
Court did not evolve a precise test in that decision, stite courts, therefore, could
distinguish subsequent cases 1 before them, as in the instant case, on the ground
that a smaller percentage of Negroes resided in the community than in the Neal
case, or the United States decisions following?
Recently in Patton v. Mississippi,8 the Supreme Court approached the
exclusion problem anew. This case held that the defendant's prima facie case
was established by merely proving that no Negro had been called to jury duty
from the Negroes in the community over an extended period of time. Thus, it
was unnecessary *to show that there was an appreciable number of qualified
Negroes in the county in proportion to the white population.0 The mathe-
matical proportion test as a test of racial discrimination in the selection of
jurors was discarded sub silentio as unsound.
The lower court, in the instant case, held that defendant did not establish
a prima facie case, although he showed no Negroes were summoned to the
grand jury for ten years, because there were so few Negroes in the community
that their absence could as easily have been laid to chance as to intentional
exclusion. Pending the appeal in the principal case, the opinion in the Patton
case was handed down. But the New York Court of Appeals failed to apply the
more liberal view established in the Patton case "0 and adopted the narrower
view of the lower court based on the mathematical proportion reasoning as de-
veloped in the cases following Neal v. Delaware." It would appear that the
decision in the instant case is uot in keeping with the trend towards greater
recognition of civil rights manifested by Patton v. Mississippi.
CRIMINAL LAW-DETERMINATION OF PROXIMATE
CAUSE BY COURT AND JURY
Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree under the
Pennsylvania felony murder statute.' An off-duty policeman had attempted
5. Accord, Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613
(1938) ; Montgomery v. State, 55 Fla. 97, 45 So. 879 (1908).
6. People v, Dessaure, 193 Misc. 381, 68 N.Y.S.2d 108 (Sup. Ct. 1946) ; Bruster v.
States, 40 Okla. Cr. R. 25, 266 Pac. 486 (1928) ; Swain v. State, 215 Ind. 259, 18 N.E.2d
921 (1913).
7. Hill v. Texas, supra; Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940) ; Pierre v. Louisiana,
306 U.S. 354 (1939).
8. 332 U.S. 463 (1947).
9. "But whatever the precise number of qualified colored electors in the county, there
were some; and if it can possibly be conceived that all of them were disqualified for jury
service by reason of the commission of crime, habitual drunkenness, gambling, inability
to read and write, or to meet any other or all of the statutory tests, we do not doubt that
the state could have proved it." Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463, 468 (1947).
10. Compare the time interval in the instant case of ten years with a thirty year period
in the Patton case.
11. Hill v. Texas, supra; Pierre v. Louisiana, supra; Hale v. Kentucky, supra,
1. "All murder . . . which shall be committed in the perpetration of . . . robbery
shall be murder in the first degree." PA. PENAL CODn § 4701 (1939).
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to apprehend defendant and his accomplices who were escaping after having
committed a robbery. In'the subsequent gunfire between defendant and other
policemen, the off-duty policeman was killed. The trial court held that the
defendant would be guilty whether he or the policemen had fired the fatal
shot. The only question presented to the jury for their determination was
whether defendant had been engaged in a robbery. On appeal, held, that he
whose felonious act is the proximate cause of another's death is criminally
responsible for that death, and that the act of robbery was, as a matter of
law, the proximate cause of the death of the policeman. Judgment affirmed.
Commonwealth v. Alneida, 68 A.2d 595 (1949).
Although a person's act may not be the direct cause of death, he will
be held responsible for all consequences of which his conduct was the proxi-
mate cause.2 Difficulty is encountered in deciding the proper functions of judge
and jury in determining proximate cause because of the varying interpretations
which have been given to the term. Proximate cause 8 is composed of two
elements: (1) the element of causation connecting the actor's conduct with
the cunsequences, and, (2) the element of a determination of the limits of
responsibility to be placed upon the actor for the consequences of his act.
The element of causation is a question of fact to be determined by the jury.
It is most suitably determined by answering the question of whether the
actor's conduct was a substantial factor4 in producing the consequences. The
determination of the limits of responsibility is a question of law to be deter-
mined by the court upon a consideration of many factors-past decisions,
public policy,5 and the justice of the decision.6 Therefore, proximate cause,
whether in tort or criminal law, 7 should be determined by having the court
conclude, assuming causation, whether or not the consequences come within
the limits of responsibility under the rule violated, and then having the jury
determine if causation did in fact exist.
However, this procedure has not been followed in cases with fact situa-
tions similar to that of the principal case. Instead of the judge and jury each
determining their respective question of law and fact, the solution of the
problem has been attempted by three general methods. First, the entire
problem of proximate cause has been presented to the jury as a fact question
2. MILLER, CRIINArr. LAW 83 (1934).
3. For discussions of proximate cause see GRPtEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE
(1927) ; Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act, 33 HARv. L. REV. 633. (1920) ;
Levitt, Cause, Legal Cause, and Proximate Cause, 21 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1922) ; Edgerton,
Legal Cause, 72 U. PA. L. REV. 211 (1924); McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39 HARV.
L. REV. 149 (1925).
4. See Smith, Legal Cause in Action of Tort, 25 HARV. L. REV. 103, 309 (1911).
5. As to public policy in regard to felony murder cases see MILLER, CRuMNrA. LAw
92 (1934).
6. See Edgerton, Legal Cause, 72 U. of PA. L. REV. 211, 343 (1924).
7. For the view that the question of proximate cause presents the same problem
in both tort and criminal law, see McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39 HARv. L. REv. 149.
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of causation.8 Second, the jury has been asked to determine both the limits
of responsibility and causation. 9 Third, the court has determined both the
limits of responsibility and causation.' 0
The court in the principal case has followed the third method above
in determining proximate cause by deciding both the limits of responsibility
and causation. The only question presented to the jury was the question of
whether defendant had been engaged in a robbery at the time of the death.
But proof of robbery alone doesn't establish causal connection between the
robbery and the death. 1 ' Nor should the fact of causal connection be assumed
by the court.1 2 This court cites Conmonmwealth v. Moyer13 as authority for
determining proximate cause as a matter of law, however, although that case
did establish that the limits of responsibility under the felony murder statute
in Pennsylvania do extend to cover the fact situation of the principal case, it
cannot be said to have eliminated the necessity of a fact determination of
causation by the jury.'
4
It is submitted that the court in the principal case properly performed its
function as the determiner of policy by stating the limits of responsibility
under the felony murder statute, but that the court invaded the province of
the jury in deciding the fact question of causation. Though the result cannot
be said to have been unjust in this case, deviations from the principle that the
jury is the determiner of fact should be avoided since such deviations are
likely to be accepted as authority in future cases involving the question of
proximate cause.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-RIGHT OF INFANT TO
BRING AN ACTION FOR THE ENTICING AWAY OF A PARENT
Infants brought suit by their father and next friend against the defendant
for wrongfully enticing and inducing their mother to leave them and their
family home. A motion was filed by the defendant to dismiss the suit on the
grounds that the alleged cause was not recognized in the state of Michigan
since "heart balm" actions had been abolished.' Held, that a child has a legally
8. Butler v. State, 125 Ii. 641, 18 N.E. 338 (1888); Taylor v. State, 41 Tex.
Cr. R. 564, 55 S.W. 961 (1900).
9. Keaton v. State, 41 Tex. Cr. R. 621, 57 S.W. 1125 (1900).
10. Letner v. Tenn., 156 Tenn. 68, 299 S.W. 1049 (1927).
11. Commonwealth v. Kelly, 333 P. 280, 4 A.2d 805 (1939) ; State v. Golden, 67
Idaho 497, 186 P.2d 485 (1947).
12. State v. Lanto, 98 N.J.L. 401, 121 A. 139 (1923) ; People v. Marendi, 213 N.Y.
600, 107 N.E. 1058 (1915).
13. 357 Pa. 181, 53 A.2d 736 (1947).
14. Though the court in Commonwealth v. Moyer did, in effect, determine causa-
tion, it was due to an inadequate presentation of the question to the jury rather than due
to a decision that such question was for the court to determine.
1. Mich. Comp. LAWS, § 551.302 (1948).
